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Most people will not be surprised to hear that homosexuality is an 
extremely taboo subject in the Arab world.  In a region heavily influenced by 
Islam, the idea of homosexuality is seen as antithetical to some of the most 
important principles of Arab society: family and procreation.1  As a result, 
several Arab countries have very strict, severe laws outlawing same-sex acts that 
proscribe prison sentences, lashes, and, in some cases, even the death penalty as 
proper punishments.2  Moreover, due to these strict laws, homosexuals are also 
subject to police entrapment, blackmail, torture,3 and have been banned from 
frequenting certain public establishments.4  However, far worse to many openly 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgendered (LGBT) people in the Arab world is 
the potential shame and possible ensuing violence they will face in their homes, 
where they fear not only how their families will react, but also how being openly 
homosexual will affect the reputation of their family name.5 
Homosexual acts, however, are much more widespread in the region than 
one might expect.  As Stephen Murray notes in his book Homosexualities, the 
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existence of such laws against homosexual acts is a testament to the acts’ 
desirability for some people within the society and the truth is that the acts still 
occur frequently.6  The catch, however, is that the acts occur in a very specific 
manner, where they are based primarily on power structures and dynamics in 
which the powerful and powerless are clearly defined, whether it involves age or 
gender stratification (or both).7  The acts also function under the guise of 
collective denial, where both the actors and the society deny or at least fail to 
acknowledge that the acts exist and are still happening.8  The true problems with 
homosexuality arise when this idea of collective denial is challenged and the 
lines between the public and private spheres of society are blurred and severed 
(i.e., someone breaks the silence and clearly defines himself as homosexual in a 
public manner).  Does this mean that homosexual men should continue to keep 
silent or, by challenging the status quo, is there a future possibility of a tolerated 
gay Arab identity?  Is the notion of a “gay identity” even relevant to the region? 
A large portion of the international human rights community has reacted 
strongly to the violence, discrimination, and persecution that openly LGBT 
people face in the Arab world, calling for the protection of LGBT people through 
the application of international human rights law.  Most notably, in 2007, a group 
of human rights experts released The Yogyakarta Principles: Principles on the 
Application of International Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation and 
Gender Identity (hereinafter the “Yogyakarta Principles” or the “Principles”), 
which were “intended as a coherent and comprehensive identification of the 
obligation of States to respect, protect and fulfill the human rights of all persons 
regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity.”9  Per the Yogyakarta 
Principles, “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights,” and 
sexual orientation and gender identity are “integral to every person’s dignity and 
humanity and must not be the basis for discrimination or abuse.”10  However, 
while such human rights are universal in theory, does the application of the 
Yogyakarta Principles provide a practical solution for the human rights issues 
and societal tensions that revolve around homosexuality in the Arab world?  
And will international pressure to follow such human rights principles actually 
work, particularly when many in the Arab world see such principles as a western 
imposition (or ‘westoxication’11)? 
As a result of this perceived “westoxication,” the push for international 
LGBT rights in the Arab world certainly has not been without critics.  Most 
notably, Joseph Massad of Columbia University criticizes the idea of such an 
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 8.  Id. at 9. 
 9.  Michael O’Flaherty & John Fisher, Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and International Human 
Rights Law: Contextualising the Yogyakarta Principles, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 207, 207 (2008). 
 10.  THE YOGYAKARTA PRINCIPLES: PRINCIPLES ON THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW IN RELATION TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY 6 (2007). 
 11.  Vanja Hamzić, The Case of ‘Queer Muslims’: Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in 
International Human Rights Law and Muslim Legal and Social Ethos, 11 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 237, 259 (2011).  
The term ‘westoxication’ (in Farsi: gharbzadegi), popular among the clerical elites of the present day 
Iran, was coined by Ahmad Fardid, an Iranian intellectual.  Id. at 259 n.136. 
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openly gay identity in the Arab world, particularly with regards to the 
promotion of LGBT rights.12  Massad claims that the promotion of gay rights in 
Arab countries is an imperialist-style “missionary” project in which the “Gay 
International” forces the Arab to subscribe to a heterosexual/homosexual binary, 
thus “heterosexualizing” him because when only given the choice to be one or 
the other, heterosexuality will be the compulsory choice given that being 
exclusively homosexual deviates from the cultural norm.13  Thus, Massad’s 
critique seriously questions the notion of sexual identity classifications in the 
region. 
While there is certainly an argument that this idea of an openly gay identity 
is a westernized notion of sexual identity, Massad does not address the 
aforementioned human rights concerns in the Arab world with regards to LGBT 
rights in his critique, and offers no solutions to these issues.  So, where does that 
leave the conversation?  Some argue, that in the aftermath of the “Arab Spring,”14 
the time is ripe for the promotion of LGBT rights in the Arab world.15  Given the 
spirit of political revolution behind the Arab Spring, the argument goes, now is 
also the time for cultural and societal revolution.  The reality, however, is that the 
Arab Spring has seen the rise and election of Islamist groups,16 such as the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Ennahda party in Tunisia, both of which 
still view homosexuality as perversion or deviance.17 Thus, “while gay Arabs 
have been generally supportive of the Arab Spring, the Arab Spring has not been 
very supportive of gay Arabs.”18  While the Arab Spring has certainly brought 
about dramatic change to the Arab world, and while there has been some shift in 
attitudes towards homosexuality in the region, the state of LGBT rights in the 
Arab world in the aftermath of the Arab Spring is precariously uncertain at best. 
This note explores the tensions and complexities that arise when exploring 
homosexual identities, human rights concerns, and LGBT rights advocacy in the 
Arab world.  Part I of this note will provide some background on how 
homosexuality and homosexual identity functions in the Arab world.  In 
particular, the section will discuss the long history of homosexual/homoerotic 
acts in the region, while also looking at the specific ways in which these acts 
occur, where the acts are based primarily on power structures, power dynamics, 
 
 12.  See Joseph Massad, Re-Orienting Desire: The Gay International and the Arab World, 14 PUB. 
CULTURE 361, 383–84 (2002). 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  See Garry Blight, Sheila Pulham & Paul Torpey, Arab Spring: An Interactive Timeline of Middle 
East Protests, GUARDIAN UK (Jan. 5, 2012), available at 
www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2011/mar/22/middle-east-protest-interactive-timeline. 
 15.  See Ernesto Londono, Egypt’s gays hope for change in culture after revolt, WASH. POST (Aug. 19, 
2011), available at www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/egypts-gays-hope-for-change-in-culture-
after-revolt/2011/08/15/gIQAOiskQJ_story.html (“Egypt’s gays [have] emerged buoyed from the 
uprising that toppled President Hosni Mubarak in February.  Increasingly visible and willing to 
speak up, they show how upheavals across the Arab world could prove to be social and cultural 
revolutions, albeit with uncertain outcomes.”). 
 16.  See generally JOHN R. BRADLEY, AFTER THE ARAB SPRING: HOW ISLAMISTS HIJACKED THE 
MIDDLE EAST REVOLTS (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 
 17. Id. at 48–49, 80–90. 
 18.  Brian Whitaker, Gay Rights and the Arab Spring, AL-BAB.COM BLOG (Feb. 25, 2012), 
http://www.al-bab.com/blog/2012/blog1202.htm. 
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and collective denial.  Part II of this note then looks at the serious dangers LGBT 
people, or people that perform homosexual/homoerotic acts, have faced and 
currently face in the region.  Part III of this note discusses the push for 
international LGBT rights in the Arab world, particularly through the application 
of international human rights law and the Yogyakarta Principles, and then engages 
with the criticisms that have resulted from this push, particularly from scholar 
Joseph Massad.  Finally, Part IV of this note looks at potential methods of LGBT 
advocacy in the region, particularly in the aftermath of the Arab Spring.  More 
specifically, as the effects of the Arab Spring develop more clearly, this note 
argues that for the time being LGBT people, and those participating in same-sex 
sexual acts, in the Arab world should engage in what Hassan El Menyawi calls 
“activism from the closet,” by which advocates can push for the strengthening of 
privacy rights while also attempting to broaden the discussion about sexual 
identities in the Arab world to include models that are more relevant to the 
region. 
I. HOMOSEXUALITY/HOMOEROTICISM IN THE ARAB WORLD 
This section attempts to give readers some background about the long 
history of homosexuality and homoeroticism in the Arab world, as well as the 
different dynamics that play a role in same-sex acts in the region.  Having a 
deeper comprehension of this background is important to better understanding 
the Arab world’s perceptions of the concept of sexual identity, as well as the 
region’s general resistance to the international human rights framework for 
LGBT advocacy.  As this section demonstrates, homosexual and homoerotic acts 
have been occurring in the Arab world for quite some time, and are still 
occurring to this day, but these acts are based primarily on power structures, 
power dynamics, and collective denial.  The specific nature in which these same-
sex acts occur ultimately calls into question the viability of the Arab world to 
follow an international LGBT human rights framework, because such a 
framework is in many ways dependent on people openly defining themselves in 
accordance with their sexual acts.  This issue will be explored further in the 
following sections. 
A. Male Homosexuality and Power Dynamics 
Despite the myriad of problems facing homosexuals, and despite claims that 
homosexuality is not an Arab issue,19 homosexual and homoerotic acts have been 
abundant in the Arab world for a long time and are far from a foreign concept.  
As Sabine Schmidtke explains in her article Homoeroticism and Homosexuality in 
Islam, “the frequency of homosexual practices in the Islamic world is well 
attested by a variety of sources, such as prose romances, poetry, adab literature, 
dreambooks, and legal and medicine literature.”20  Some even claim that the 
 
 19.  Most famously, at a speech at Columbia University, Iranian President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad stated: “In Iran we don’t have homosexuals like in your country[.] . . . In Iran we do not 
have this phenomenon.  I don’t know who’s told you that we have this.”  Ahmadinejad Blasts Israel, 
Denies Existence of Iranian Gays During Columbia Speech, FOXNEWS.COM (Sept. 24, 2007), available at 
www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,297823,00.html. 
 20.  Sabine Schmidtke, Homoeroticism and Homosexuality in Islam: A Review Article, 62 BULL. SCH. 
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“Arab and Moslem world” is a “highly homosexualized region”21 because “male 
homoeroticism is deep within [its] cultural roots.”22  Indeed, the acts have taken 
place for several centuries, stretching back to the Mamluks and the Ottomans. 
Murray argues that before the twentieth century, Northern Africa and 
Southwestern Asia were the regions of the world with the most diverse and 
visible homosexualities .23  Some scholars look to the absence of females due to 
the segregation of the genders as a possible cause for the frequency of these acts, 
because “an extreme separation between [the] sexes and deprivation of the 
feminine element leads to substitutive homosexual intercourse.”24  Even T.E. 
Lawrence, better known as Lawrence of Arabia, describes the “instance . . . of the 
eastern boy and boy affection which the segregation of women [makes] 
inevitable.”25 
However, while arguably more open in the past, these acts primarily 
continue today under the guise of collective denial, in which both the actors and 
the society deny or at least fail to acknowledge that the acts take place because 
there is a “common Islamic ethos of avoidance in acknowledging sex and 
sexualities”26 and because “[i]n Muslim culture honor is not lost by doing 
something but by being seen doing it, by not at least denying it.”27 Thus, people 
can successfully avoid deviations from the sexual norm by engaging in same-sex 
sexual behavior in private.  This idea is further enhanced by the clear delineation 
between the public and private spheres of life, whereby the private sphere (i.e., 
the privacy of the home) cannot and should not be violated, but in public people 
keep up appearances and deny any instances of homosexual behavior.  
Furthermore, the fact that making accusations is very difficult under Islamic law 
furthers this notion.  At least “[f]our trustworthy Muslim men must testify that 
they have seen ‘the key entering the key hole’ or the culprit must confess four 
times.”28  And there is a risk of punishment for not adequately proving a claim, 
thus, in many cases people would rather look the other way.29  Moreover, in 
Arab culture “snooping into people’s private lives is a vulgar way of behaving 
 
ORIENTAL & AFR. STUD. 260, 260 (1999). 
 21.  Rex Wockner, Homosexuality in the Arab and Moslem World, in COMING OUT: AN ANTHOLOGY 
OF INTERNATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN WRITINGS 103, 104 (Stephan Likosky ed., 1992). 
 22.  Id. at 105 (quoting Lisa Power, cosecretary general of the International Lesbian and Gay 
Association). 
 23.  Will Roscoe & Stephen O. Murray, Introduction, in ISLAMIC HOMOSEXUALITIES: CULTURE, 
HISTORY, AND LITERATURE 3, 6 (Stephen O. Murray & Will Roscoe eds., 1997). 
 24.  Frédéric Lagrange, Male Homosexuality in Modern Arabic Literature, in IMAGINED 
MASCULINITIES: MALE IDENTITY AND CULTURE IN THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST 169, 179, (Mai Ghoussoub 
& Emma Sinclair-Webb eds., 2000). 
 25.  Joseph A. Boone, Vacation Cruises; Or, the Homoerotics of Orientalism, 110 PMLA 89, 97 (1995) 
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 26.  Stephen O. Murray, The Will Not to Know: Islamic Accommodations of Male Homosexuality, in 
ISLAMIC HOMOSEXUALITIES: CULTURE, HISTORY, AND LITERATURE 14, 14 (Stephen O. Murray & Will 
Roscoe eds., 1997) [hereinafter The Will Not to Know]. 
 27.  Arno Schmitt, Sexual Meetings of East and West: Western Tourism and Muslim Immigrant 
Communities, in SEXUALITY AND EROTICISM AMONG MALES IN MOSLEM SOCIETIES 125, 128 (Arno 
Schmitt & Jehoeda Sofer eds., 1992) [hereinafter Sexual Meetings]. 
 28.  Murray, supra note 26, at 15. 
 29.  See id. 
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that is [considered] inappropriate.”30 
Homosexual acts, regardless of their motivations, tend to be based primarily 
on power structures, where social actors are categorized into roles of power or 
subordination, clearly defining what is “normal” or “deviant.”  To an Egyptian, 
sexual behavior conforms to a particular concept of gender that “is characterized 
by the ‘general importance of male dominance, the centrality of penetration to 
conceptions of sex [and] the radical disjunction of active and passive roles in 
male homosexuality.’”31  Furthermore, “[i]t is the right of [the man] to penetrate 
and their duty to lie on top.”32  These ideas fit into the greater social picture of 
patriarchy that is predicated upon the “subordination of women to men and 
young to old.”33  In this way, sexual roles in homosexual acts are based primarily 
on power dynamics, in which the powerful and powerless are clearly defined, 
whether in terms of active (penetrator) and passive (penetrated) sexual roles (i.e., 
“masculine” or “feminine” roles) or in terms of age-stratified roles (between 
powerful adult “men” and powerless boys). 
The clear distinction between the active masculine partner and the passive 
feminine partner is an essential element of same-sex acts between adult men in 
the Arab world because sexual intercourse cannot “take place between equals 
and necessarily involves the exercise of power.”34  Sex in this way becomes an act 
of male domination where those who penetrate (the active role) have the power 
while those who are penetrated (the passive role) are powerless and in complete 
subordination to the active, dominant partner.  As Bruce Dunne explains, sex (or 
more specifically the act of penetration)  
took place between dominant, free adult men and subordinate 
social inferiors: wives, concubines, boys, prostitutes (male and 
female) and slaves (male and female).  What was at stake was 
not mutuality between partners but the adult male’s 
achievement of pleasure through domination.35  
In this way, the act itself is less about its homosexual/homoerotic nature, but 
about the power and dominance behind it.  The idea of deriving pleasure from 
power and domination is seen clearly in Sa’dallah Wannus’ work Tuqus al-isharat 
wa-l-tahawwulat (“The rites of signs and transformations”), where ‘Abbas, the 
active partner, denies any sort of romantic passion or feeling between himself 
and al-’Asfa, the passive partner, saying that he “took pleasure in mounting a 
man . . . watching him bend and make himself small between [his] legs.”36 
Moreover, in most cases, by taking the active, “masculine” role in same-sex 
relations, these men are not necessarily considered “homosexual,” because 
 
 30.  WHITAKER, supra note 5, at 66. 
 31.  Power and Sexuality, supra note 7, at 9 (alteration in original). 
 32.  Arno Schmitt, Different Approaches to Male-Male Sexuality/Eroticism from Morocco to Usbekistān, 
in SEXUALITY AND EROTICISM AMONG MALES IN MOSLEM SOCIETIES 1, 2–3 (Arno Schmitt & Jehoeda 
Sofer eds., 1992) [hereinafter Different Approaches]. 
 33.  Bruce W. Dunne, Homosexuality in the Middle East: An Agenda for Historical Research, 12(3/4) 
ARAB STUD. Q. 55, 64 (1990) [hereinafter Agenda for Historical Research]. 
 34.  Lagrange, supra note 24, at 173. 
 35.  Power and Sexuality, supra note 7, at 10. 
 36.  Lagrange, supra note 24, at 181–82. 
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“[h]omosexual acts do not imply an exclusive sexual interest.”37  “A man who 
plays the active, penetrator role in a homosexual act behaves like a man, and is 
therefore not considered ‘homosexual.’”38 His actions are not necessarily 
regarded as shameful or as any indication of his sexual orientation - a concept 
that is not particularly palpable to an Arab culture that is far more concerned 
with sexual acts than sexual identities - because he is “merely performing the 
role that men normally perform in intercourse with women.”39  In this way, the 
social recognition of separate sexual roles  
between ‘active’ inserter and ‘passive’ insertee . . . enables many 
heterosexual men to engage in homosexual relations which are 
considered to be a ‘secondary sexual outlet’, since, for them, 
although the sexual relation takes place in a ‘homosexual 
context’, it satisfies a ‘heterosexual need’.40   
In fact, some of these men may even confer a status of hyper-masculinity and 
hyper-heterosexuality by dominating another adult male, which is thought to 
require “greater strength or sexual prowess.”41 
In most cases, the active partner’s social respectability actually remains 
unscathed because “homosexual intercourse, when occurring between a grown 
man and one who is submitted to his authority because of his age or social status, 
finds its place in the social hierarchy and never jeopardizes the order.”42  
Moreover, Arabs “tend to accept the lūtī [active partner], since he acts as a strong 
man subjugating a non-man,”43 and by definition “the fucker is in no danger of 
being considered queer.”44  This circumstance, however, is not the same for the 
“passive” partner, who in “allowing [himself] to be possessed by another male 
leads to general mockery and loss of social status.”45  Men who “do not fit readily 
into prevailing notions of true manhood . . . are often looked down upon and 
despised.”46  A man’s willing submission to another man denotes a loss of self-
respect and power because “[p]assive homosexual behavior . . . implies being 
penetrated like a woman, and is considered to be extremely scandalous and 
humiliating for a man, because it is feminine behavior.”47  Thus “[m]en are not 
‘real’ men if they behave passively in sex, an (sic) illusion driven home 
relentlessly by a culture that insists that, in practice, anyway, gay men are 
 
 37.  Agenda for Historical Research, supra note 33, at 65. 
 38.  Maarten Schild, Islam, in SEXUALITY AND EROTICISM AMONG MALES IN MOSLEM SOCIETIES 179, 
185 (Arno Schmitt & Jehoeda Sofer eds., 1992). 
 39.  WHITAKER, supra note 5, at 206. 
 40.  Huseyin Tapinc, Masculinity, Femininity, and Turkish Male Homosexuality, in MODERN 
HOMOSEXUALITIES: FRAGMENTS OF LESBIAN AND GAY EXPERIENCE 39, 41 (Ken Plummer ed., 1992). 
 41.  WHITAKER, supra note 5, at 206. 
 42.  Lagrange, supra note 24, at 172. 
 43.  Gianni De Martino, An Italian in Morocco (Arno Schmitt trans.), in SEXUALITY AND EROTICISM 
AMONG MALES IN MOSLEM SOCIETIES 25, 27 (Arno Schmitt & Jehoeda Sofer eds., 1992). 
 44.  Jerry Zarit, Intimate Look of the Iranian Male, in SEXUALITY AND EROTICISM AMONG MALES IN 
MOSLEM SOCIETIES 55, 56 (Arno Schmitt & Jehoeda Sofer eds., 1992). 
 45.  Lagrange, supra note 24, at 181. 
 46.  Jeffrey Weeks, Foreword, in SEXUALITY AND EROTICISM AMONG MALES IN MOSLEM SOCIETIES 
ix, x (Arno Schmitt & Jehoeda Sofer eds., 1992). 
 47.  Schild, supra note 38, at 185. 
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women”48 and that women are inferior to men.  This idea is emphasized by Arno 
Schmitt, who declares: “A man should not allow others to bugger him.  
Otherwise he loses his name [and] his honor [because] . . . ‘only someone who 
can’t fuck would allow others to fuck him.’”49 
In addition, many consider the state of desiring penetration (ubnah) to be an 
illness,’50 because it is “incomprehensible that a man could voluntarily choose to 
be dishonored and debased in the role of a woman.”51  His willingness to “take 
pleasure in a subordinate sexual role, in submitting to penetration, [is] deemed 
inexplicable, and could only be attributed to pathology.”52  As a result, “to show 
that one likes it increases the stigma,”53 especially because of the general 
association that the passive partner would become addicted to being in the 
passive role because “[i]t is like an infectious disease.”54  Due to these 
distinctions in sexual roles, in many Arab cultures, where penetration is central 
to their ideas and conceptions of homosexuality, the only “homosexual” in the 
sexual act is the one that takes the passive, “feminine,” role.55  The division of 
public and private spheres becomes essential in this process of stigmatization.  
Even though the Islamic norm is that a man in the sexually passive role has lost 
his honor and should be despised, “[t]here is always room for 
manoeuv[ering]. . . . As long as nobody draws public attention to something 
everybody knows, one ignores what might disrupt important social relations.”56  
Moreover, “it would be shameful to denounce somebody as having been 
[penetrated].  Done discreetly one is able to pretend that nothing has 
happened.”57  In this way, “[t]he Maģribī . . . ‘forgets’ all the things one does not 
talk about.”58 
The predominant idiom for same-sex relations in Arab societies, however, 
has been age-stratified, where the expression of sexual power dynamics takes the 
form of pederasty in which an older Arab man penetrates a younger boy.59  The 
boy then ceases to be penetrated soon after reaching puberty and may penetrate 
younger boys in return.  The use of boys, Murray notes, is viewed as an 
alternative sexual outlet and release for a society where access to women is 
severely restricted, and the use of boys, who can still become honorable men in 
 
 48.  Gary B. MacDonald, Among Syrian Men, in SEXUALITY AND EROTICISM AMONG MALES IN 
MOSLEM SOCIETIES 43, 49 (Arno Schmitt & Jehoeda Sofer eds., 1992). 
 49.  Different Approaches, supra note 32, at 7 (emphasis added). 
 50.  The idea of ubnah was first discussed in Ar-Razi’s Treatise on the Hidden Illness.  See Agenda for 
Historical Research, supra note 31, at 59. 
 51.  Schild, supra note 36, at 185. 
 52.  Power and Sexuality, supra note 7, at 10 (internal quotations omitted). 
 53.  Different Approaches, supra note 32, at 7. 
 54.  Id. at 8. 
 55.  Tapinc, supra note 40, at 42. 
 56.  Different Approaches, supra note 32, at 7. 
 57.  De Martino, supra note 43, at 27. 
 58.  Id. at 29. 
 59. See HOMOSEXUALITIES, supra note 6, at 130 (“Boys are much more available, and their sexual 
use less serious than the expropriation of the bodies of women to which some other man has the 
rights or the responsibility of conserving.”). 
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the end, also protects women’s virtue and purity.60  In fact, Everett Rowson 
argues that there are parallels between male active homosexual desire for boys 
and male heterosexual desire for women in that the “canons for beauty of boys 
are virtually the same as those for women.”61 Bruce Dunne supports this idea 
using the example of Morocco where, for the notables of Fez, “it [was] just as 
good form to have a mezlough (a small pre-pubescent boy) or a hassas (a youth 
having reached puberty) as a pretty mistress.”62 
In classical times, boys were often the object of great passion and the subject 
of love poems; “a great many poets . . . have not hesitated, at some point or other 
in their career, to sing the praises of a youth.”63  James Silk Buckingham, who 
journeyed through Mesopotamia in 1817, discussed at length adult men’s 
“platonic” love for respectable boys where “‘the youths who [were] the avowed 
favourites or beloved of particular individuals [were] as much respected and 
thought as honourably of, as any virtuous girl.’”64  Arno Schmitt supports this 
idea saying, the fact “[t]hat all men were susceptible to boyish beauty was taken 
for granted.  Many would fall in love with boys.”65  The Mamluks of Egypt were 
apparently addicted to pederasty,66 “and others have stressed that parents 
groomed sons for sexual service to the rulers and, when successful, sold them.”67  
These youths in many cases also improved their social status because favorite 
boys could grow up to marry their masters’ daughters or take over their 
businesses, properties, etc.68  Al-Hakim II, the Khalif of Cordoba from 961–976, 
was also “so exclusively committed to boy-love that in order to please him, his 
wife Subh had to dress like a boy and bear the masculine name Djafar.”69  
Another example of male-boy relations occurred among the Afghan Pathan, 
where effeminate youths would also play the role of camp wife:  
These Zune-e-suffuree (traveling wives) were the essential part of 
any camel caravan or other company of travelers passing 
through the forbidden Khyber [Pass] and into the fertile 
Punjab . . . [T]hese youths, ranging in age from five to twenty 
years, were scented, depilated, rouged hennaed, and adorned 
with long silken pomaded hair and kohl-rimmed provocative 
 
 60. See id. 
 61.  Everett K. Rowson, The Categorization of Gender and Sexual Irregularity in Medieval Arabic Vice 
Lists, in BODY GUARDS: THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF GENDER AMBIGUITY 50, 58 (Julia Epstein & Kristina 
Straub eds., 1991). 
 62.  Power and Sexuality, supra note 7, at 62. 
 63.  Charles Pellat, Liwat, in SEXUALITY AND EROTICISM AMONG MALES IN MOSLEM SOCIETIES 151, 
157 (Arno Schmitt & Jehoeda Sofer, eds., 1992). 
 64.  Stephen O. Murray, Some Nineteenth-Century Reports of Islamic Homosexualities, in ISLAMIC 
HOMOSEXUALITIES: CULTURE, HISTORY, AND LITERATURE 204, 205 (Stephen O. Murray & Will Roscoe, 
eds., 1997) [hereinafter Nineteenth-Century Reports]. 
 65. Different Approaches, supra note 30, at 5. 
 66.  Stephen O. Murray, Male Homosexuality, Inheritance Rules, and the Status of Women in Medieval 
Egypt: The Case of the Mamlūks, in ISLAMIC HOMOSEXUALITIES: CULTURE, HISTORY, AND LITERATURE 161, 
165 (Stephen O. Murray & Will Roscoe, eds., 1997) [hereinafter The Case of the Mamlūks]. 
 67. HOMOSEXUALITIES, supra note 6, at 54. 
 68.  Id. at 56–57. 
 69. The Will Not to Know, supra note 26, 23–24 (internal quotations omitted). 
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eyes.70 
In the same vain, Gavin Maxwell, a Scottish author that traveled to Morocco 
in 1966, observed that boys often accompanied imperial troops to satisfy their 
sexual needs.71  These relations were not limited to military life, however, and 
even formed a part of the religious order where, as Finnish sociologist Edward 
Westermarck observed in Morocco,”[s]exual intercourse with a saintly person 
[was] considered beneficial . . . [I]t [was] a common belief among the Arabic-
speaking mountaineers of Northern Morocco that a boy [could not] learn the 
Koran well unless a scribe commit[ed] pederasty with him.”72 
Once again, the penetration of boys, just like with the penetration of 
feminized men, does not compromise a man’s masculinity or heterosexuality 
because, as Rowson notes, “if to be male (and adult) is to penetrate, men who 
penetrated boys were just as masculine as those who penetrated women.”73  
However, whereas the adult passive male is scorned and seen as powerless, boys 
could be penetrated without losing their potential manhood because “[a]s long as 
the penetrated was a boy who was not yet virile, his masculinity was not 
regarded as compromised by his taking of the passive role”74; thus, there was no 
stigma in this process.  However, boys were not supposed to enjoy being 
penetrated because of the concern that this enjoyment would develop into an 
addiction and would continue into adulthood.  And those boys that were known 
to have been penetrated were thought to be game to everyone else for 
penetration.  Pederasty would continue until the boys became older and more 
manly and thus, less desirable.  The natural cycle was such that these boys would 
become “men” and then go on to get married and penetrate women and other 
boys as well.  Schmitt describes this natural progression from a boy’s “desire to 
be [penetrated], and the desire to be taken care of . . . transformed into the wish 
to sodomise and to appear invulnerable.”75  Thus, as men, they should no longer 
desire or accept the passive role in such relations.  Gianni De Martino sums up 
these ideas: “[b]y the age of 15 or 16 a zamel [someone submitting to anal 
intercourse] loses his admirers or he starts refusing advances: becomes a ‘man’, 
i.e. he fucks boys and courts girls.”76 
B. Private Lies, Public Scorn 
How can there be so many problems with homosexuality in the Arab world 
when homosexual acts have been so widespread over its history?  The idea of 
collective denial, mentioned earlier, is a crucial element to answering this 
question.  The issue with “homosexuality” arises when the men who perform 
these acts clearly and publicly define themselves as homosexual, that is to say, 
define their identity based on the exclusive sexual involvement with other men.  
Here, public acknowledgment becomes the primary problem because 
 
 70.  Id. at 28. 
 71.  Agenda for Historical Research, supra note 33, at 61–62. 
 72.  Nineteenth-Century Reports, supra note 64, at 217–18. 
 73.  Rowson, supra note 61, at 69. 
 74.  Schmidtke, supra note 20, at 261. 
 75.  Different Approaches, supra note 32, at 3. 
 76.  De Martino, supra note 43, at 26. 
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homosexuality is “a subject that Arabs . . . are generally reluctant to discuss”77 
and “those who publicly flout the codes [for conformity] bring ‘shame’ upon the 
community as well as themselves.”78  By breaking away from the expectations set 
in the public and private spheres of life and by rupturing the idea of collective 
denial through the presentation of exclusive, romantic homosexual relationships 
in the public sphere, openly homosexual men force people to acknowledge their 
presence. This type of public acknowledgment goes against some of the most 
important principles of Arab society: family, procreation, and Islam, where 
homosexuality is seen as a ‘fierce attack on progeny and pregnancy.’79  
Moreover, the idea of egalitarian, reciprocal sexual and romantic relations 
between men is incomprehensible.  As anthropologist Malek Chebel argues, far 
worse than the participation in homosexual acts is the presence of love, affection, 
or equality among participants,80 and “[e]qually strange is the idea that a man 
could both sodomise and be sodomised by the same man.”81  This idea is 
especially palpable when one sees that most words for “to fuck“ in Arabic have 
no form of reciprocity82 and “this vocabulary reflects a sharp separation between 
penetrator and penetratee.”83  One of the most commonly used terms for same-
sex male acts is liwat, which, as Schmitt discusses, cannot refer to a “joint action 
by several ‘equal’ actors, but only to something done by someone to somebody 
else.”84 
 So it is not that same-sex acts cannot occur, it is that everyone must keep 
up appearances that conform to the important principles and values of Arab 
society; “so long as everyone can pretend that [homosexuality] doesn’t happen, 
there is no need to do anything [to] stop it.”85  Brian Whitaker discusses this 
manner of keeping up appearances, elaborating on the  
double life that Arabs, especially the younger ones, increasingly 
lead—of a growing gap between the requirements of society and 
life as it is actually lived, between keeping up appearances in the 
name of tradition or respectability and the things people do in 
private or when away from home.86   
This “double life” almost always involves marriage, because, as already noted, 
family and progeny are of the utmost importance in Arab society.  As Brian 
Whitaker, former Middle East editor for British newspaper The Guardian, notes: 
the range of plausible excuses for not marrying at all is severely 
limited.  This presents [gay Arab men] with an unenviable 
choice: to declare their sexuality (with all the consequences that 
can entail) or to accept that marriage is inevitable and either try 
 
 77.  WHITAKER, supra note 5, at 9. 
 78.  Id. at 220. 
 79.  Id. at 149. 
 80.  Power and Sexuality, supra note 7, at 10. 
 81.  Different Approaches, supra note 32, at 6. 
 82.  Id. at 10. 
 83.  Id. at 13. 
 84.  Id. at 14. 
 85.  WHITAKER, supra note 5, at 10. 
 86.  Id. at 7. 
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to suppress their homosexual feelings or pursue outlets for them 
alongside marriage.87 
Moreover, the majority of Arabs feel an incredible sense of loyalty and duty 
to their families and many openly gay Arabs are willing to put this loyalty before 
notions of their own sexuality, especially when being openly gay will tarnish a 
family’s respectability and status (and may prevent brothers and sisters from 
marrying, etc.).88  However, if a man fulfills his role as a husband and a father in 
the public realm, what he does in private many times is not questioned.  This is 
because publicly condemned sexual acts, such as same-sex sexual relations, can 
occur provided that the paramount values of family maintenance and 
reproduction are not threatened.89  So while a man must comply with his role by 
marrying and having children, “[a]s long as he maintains his role in public, his 
private preferences and idiosyncrasies are nobody’s business but his own, that is 
if he is discrete about them, and harms no one.”90  In this way, it is “only [the] 
public transgression of Islamic morals that is condemned”91 and it is only 
through silence and collective denial that homosexual acts still occur in Arab 
society without severe repercussions.  But this type of framework leaves very 
little room for egalitarian homosexual relations. 
This framework also lends credence to the idea that a sexual identity that is 
based on homosexual/homoerotic acts (also known as a “substitutive” model, 
discussed later) may simply not be a relevant or salient concept in the Arab 
world.  This is an imposition of a heterosexual/homosexual binary, a Western 
orientalist imposition, because sexuality in the Arab world does not function 
along these lines.92  This idea is important to keep in mind when thinking about 
LGBT rights advocacy in the Arab world, and will be explored further later in 
this note. 
II. FEAR AND LOATHING IN CAIRO 
When people think of homosexuality and the Arab world, the first words 
that usually come to mind are repression, discrimination, violence, the death 
penalty, denial, torture, etc.  Many of these ideas are unfortunately true; as Brian 
Whitaker discusses in his book Unspeakable Love: Gay and Lesbian Life in the Middle 
East: 
 
 87.  Id. at 25. 
 88.  Id. at 26–27. 
 89.  Power and Sexuality, supra note 7, at 9. 
 90.  Schild, supra note 38, at 184. 
 91.  Will Not to Know, supra note 26, at 15. 
 92.  See Massad, supra note 12, at 383–84 (“By inciting discourse about homosexuals where none 
existed before, the Gay International is in fact heterosexualizing a world that is being forced to be fixed 
by a Western binary. Because most non-Western civilizations, including Muslim Arab civilization, 
have not subscribed historically to these categories, their imposition is producing less than liberatory 
outcomes: men who are considered the passive or receptive parties in male-male sexual contacts are 
forced to have one object choice and identify as homosexual or gay, just as men who are the ‘active’ 
partners are also forced to limit their sexual aim to one object choice, women or men. Most ‘active’ 
partners see themselves as part of a societal norm, so heterosexuality becomes compulsory given that 
the alternative, as presented by the Gay International, means becoming marked outside the norm—
with all the attendant risks and disadvantages of such a marking.”). 
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People whose sexuality does not fit the norm have no legal 
rights; they are condemned to a life of secrecy, fearing exposure 
and sometimes blackmail; many are forced into unwanted 
marriages for the sake of their family’s reputation; there is no 
redress if they are discriminated against; and agencies providing 
advice on sexuality and related health matters are virtually non-
existent.93 
Homosexuality is indeed illegal in most Arab countries.  Thirty-six of the 
eighty-one countries identified by the International Lesbian and Gay Association 
as outlawing same-sex acts belong to the Arab league and/or Islamic Conference 
Organization.94  Not only are same-sex acts illegal in the majority of Arab 
countries, but the possible punishments and penalties for the acts can be 
particularly harsh, including long prison sentences, lashes and beatings, and 
even the death penalty in some countries (which can involve beheading or even 
stoning the “perpetrator” to death).95  Between 2001 and the release of their 
report in 2004, Human Rights Watch identified at least 179 cases in which men 
were brought before prosecutors under Egypt’s law against “debauchery,” which 
it predicts was only a miniscule percentage of the actual total.96  Hundreds of 
others, the report continues, have been “harassed, arrested, often tortured, but 
not charged.”97  While prison sentences are a far more common punishment, 
Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Afghanistan still prescribe the death penalty in some 
instances.  For example, on July 11, 2000, three men were beheaded for what the 
Saudi interior ministry described as “the extreme obscenity and ugly acts of 
homosexuality, marrying among themselves and molesting the young.”98  In 
Iran, soon after Ayatollah Khomeini came to power in 1979 and established the 
death penalty for homosexual acts, there were sixteen executions in February 
and March of 1979 alone.99 
More recent reports of human rights violations in Arab countries continue 
to include murder, torture, and arbitrary detention.  For example, in April 2009, 
at least sixty-three people were tortured and seven killed in Iraq because of their 
perceived sexual orientation.100  In addition, in June 2009, sixty-seven men were 
arrested in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia for wearing women’s clothing.101  The number 
of executions of gay people in Iran has risen sharply in the past few years,102 and 
 
 93.  WHITAKER, supra note 5, at 10. 
 94.  Id. at 112. 
 95.  Kim Krisberg, Saudis Beheaded for Sodomy, WASH. BLADE (Jan. 4, 2002), 
www.sodomylaws.org/world/saudi_arabia/saudinews15.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2012). 
 96.  In a Time of Torture, supra note 2, at 2. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Krisberg, supra note 95. 
 99.  WHITAKER, supra note 5, at 79. 
 100.  Hossein Alizadeh, Iraq: Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment of LGBT People, INT’L 
GAY & LESBIAN HUM. RTS. COMM’N BLOG (Apr. 20, 2009), 
http://iglhrc.wordpress.com/2009/04/20/iraq-torture-cruel-inhuman-and-degrading-treatment-of-
lgbt-people/.For a detailed report on these events, see They Want Us Exterminated, supra note 2. 
 101.  Saudi Arabia: Drop ‘Cross-Dressing’ Charges’, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 24, 2009), 
www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/06/24/saudi-arabia-drop-cross-dressing-charges. 
 102.  Rasheed Abou-Alsamh, Protecting Rights of Gay Citizens in Iran, PBS FRONTLINE (Dec. 10, 
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there are countless other stories in Iran and other Arab countries of violence 
against, as well as the persecution and criminalization of, LGBT people.103 
These severe laws and treatment have a basis in Islamic law because in the 
Qur’an sodomy is strongly condemned in a number of verses concerning Lot 
(Lut in the Qur’an) and his people.  While the verses are open to interpretation, 
the stricter Islamic jurist interpretation has become a legal precedent supporting 
the recommendation of stoning the homosexual perpetrator to death on the 
grounds that it replicates God’s punishment of Sodom.104  There is actually no 
clear punishment prescribed in the Qur’an, but some hadiths (narrative records of 
the sayings or customs of Muhammad and his companions), however, proclaim 
death for sodomy,105 declaring that “both the active and the passive [partner] 
should be stoned”106 because “[w]henever a male mounts another male, the 
throne of God trembles.”107  Abu Bakr, the first Caliph in Islam (and father-in-
law to Islamic prophet Muhammad), for example, condemned a homosexual to 
“be buried beneath the débris of a wall, and prescribed burning alive as the 
penalty for all those guilty of such practises (sic).”108  These ideas stem from the 
notion that: 
Sexual activity outside of marriage, adultery, is sharply 
condemned by Islamic law as a crime against humanity, which 
opens the door to many other shameful acts, and affects the 
reputation and property of the family, thereby disrupting the 
social fabric.  Homosexual behavior (liwat) . . . is considered to be 
adultery, being sex with an illicit partner . . . . Homosexual 
behavior is actually considered a revolt against God which 
violates the order of the world, and would be a source of evil 
and anarchy.109 
However, it should be noted that because sodomy is “not among the hadd 
crimes specified in the Qur’an, . . . the penalties assigned for it by the various 
 
2011, 3:28 PM), www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2011/12/xxx-un-calls-on-iran-
to-respect-protect-rights-of-gay-citizens.html. 
 103.  See Islam and Homosexuality: Straight but Narrow, ECONOMIST (Feb. 4, 2012), available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/21546002 (“Of the seven countries that impose the death penalty 
for homosexuality, all are Muslim.  Even when gays do not face execution, persecution is endemic.  In 
2010 a Saudi man was sentenced to 500 lashes and five years in jail for having sex with another man.  
In February last year, police in Bahrain arrested scores of men, mostly other Gulf nationals, at a “‘gay 
party”‘.  Iranian gay men are typically tried on other trumped-up charges.  But in September last year 
three were executed specifically for homosexuality . . . . Where laws are gentler, authorities find other 
ways to crack down.  In the Jordanian capital, Amman, several gay hangouts have been raided or 
closed on bogus charges, such as serving alcohol illegally.”).  For a detailed report on the 
mistreatment of Iranian gay men and women, see We Are a Buried Generation: Discrimination and 
Violence against Sexual Minorities in Iran, HUM. RTS. WATCH, (Dec. 15, 2010) 
www.hrw.org/reports/2010/12/15/we-are-buried-generation-0. 
 104.  WHITAKER, supra note 5, at 192. 
 105.  Jim Wafer, Muhammad and Male Homosexuality, in ISLAMIC HOMOSEXUALITIES: CULTURE, 
HISTORY, AND LITERATURE 87, 89 (Stephen O. Murray & Will Roscoe eds., 1997). 
 106.  Jehoeda Sofer, Sodomy in the Law of Muslim States, in SEXUALITY AND EROTICISM AMONG 
MALES IN MOSLEM SOCIETIES 131, 132 (Arno Schmitt & Jehoeda Sofer eds., 1992). 
 107.  Schild, supra note 38, at 181. 
 108.  Pellat, supra note 63, at 153. 
 109.  Schild, supra note 38, at 180. 
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schools of Islamic law are the result of human (and therefore fallible) processes of 
deduction.”110 
One of the major consequences of these laws and penalties is that many 
homosexuals are subjected to harsh treatment from the police, whether it involve 
raids, entrapment methods, blackmail, or torture.  One of the most notable and 
publicized cases occurred a little over a decade ago in Egypt in 2001 when the 
police raided the Queen Boat, a floating night club on the Nile that was known to 
be frequented by “men attracted to other men . . . all in the name of moral 
rectitude.”111  As a result of this raid, several dozen men were arrested and fifty-
two men went to trial.112  In 2005, police arrested more than one hundred men 
after raiding a party in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, that was described as a “gay 
wedding,” where the men—all Saudis—were reported to have been “dancing 
and ‘behaving like women.’”113  Thirty-one of the men were sentenced to 
between six months and a year of prison, with 200 lashes each.114  Four other men 
were jailed for two years, with 2,000 lashes and a further seventy men were later 
sentenced to a year in jail.115  Apart from these raids, another common, and 
newer, method of singling out homosexual acts is through entrapment, where 
informants set up “gay parties” that are later raided by the police (and where 
arrests are made) or where informants go on online to gay websites and chat 
with unsuspecting men wanting to perform homosexual acts who later will meet 
them in a public place only to be confronted by the police and arrested instead.116 
In many of these cases, homosexual men are also tortured.  After the police 
entrapped Tayseer, a Palestinian from Gaza, they told him he would have to 
become an undercover agent (where he would also entrap gay men and thus 
continue the vicious cycle) in order to avoid prison.117  When he refused, he was 
tortured.  “He was forced to stand in sewage water up to his neck, his head 
covered by a sack filled with feces, and then he was thrown into a dark cell 
infested with insects and other creatures he could feel but not see.”118  And 
during another interrogation, he was forced to sit on a coke bottle.119  In Turkey, 
the police would pick up people who they assumed were homosexual and these 
people were 
stuffed into a place which is part prison and part lunatic 
asylum—which they call a ‘hospital.’  There, even the healthy 
ones [were] diagnosed as having syphilis . . . and [they were] 
locked up, beaten, and humiliated.  Their hair [was] cut and they 
[were] thrown out of the city . . . [The police] notif[ied their] 
 
 110.  WHITAKER, supra note 5, at 118. 
 111.  Id. at 8. 
 112.  Id. at 8, 49. 
 113.  Saudi Arabia: Men “Behaving Like Women” Face Flogging, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 7, 2005), 
www.hrw.org/news/2005/04/06/saudi-arabia-men-behaving-women-face-flogging. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  See In a Time of Torture, supra note 2, at 5–6; WHITAKER, supra note 5, at 23-26. 
 117. Yossi Klein Halevi, Refugee Status, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 19, 2002), 
www.tnr.com/article/refugee-status (last visited Mar. 23, 2012). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
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employers in writing, causing homosexuals to be interrogated 
and to lose their jobs.  [The police] even notif[ied their] 
parents.”120 
Similarly, a Police Commissioner of the Beyoglu area, which has been 
known for having a large number of gay men, ordered several raids on gay 
homes, leaving doors smashed.  The men were then “stripped naked, truncheons 
were inserted into their anuses and they were beaten severely.”121  As a result of 
such incidents, many times when homosexuals are attacked, assaulted, or 
robbed, they cannot turn to the police for help because they fear being further 
criminalized and tortured instead. 
Far worse than being entrapped and tortured by the police for the gay Arab 
man, however, is the idea of being discovered and disclosed to his family.  As 
Gary B. MacDonald’ notes, “even the death penalty is less feared than disclosure 
before one’s family and friends.  Gays tremble merely to imagine the ostracism 
that would result from the most important act of coming out.  Compared to it, 
self-imposed exile is trivial.”122  Whitaker also discusses the idea that: “[f]ear of 
the law seems less immediately relevant than fear of the ‘shame’ that would be 
heaped upon a gay man’s family if his sexuality became known.”123  Whitaker 
recounts many stories from Arabs he interviewed who were beaten severely by 
their families, one of whom was even imprisoned in his own house for five days, 
locked in the boot of a car, threatened at gunpoint, and told “if I find out one day 
that you are gay, you’re dead.  It’s not good for our family and our name.”124  
Having homosexuality in the family incurs a large stigma that can make other 
siblings worse candidates for marriage, and many Arab homosexuals’ loyalty to 
their family is much stronger than their desire to be open about their sexuality.125 
That being said, while many gay Arab men accept silence and denial as a 
part of life, others attempt to leave the country, primarily due to fear of the 
authorities and their family (who in many cases exact physical violence on gay 
family members when they discover they are gay).  These attempts, however, are 
usually unsuccessful because even though the 1951 UN Convention and Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees stipulates that countries have a legal duty to 
offer protection to those people with a “well-founded fear of being persecuted 
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group 
or political opinion,”126 many countries (even countries where sexually-based 
persecution is an accepted principle) have still refused asylum to gay Arabs who 
fear persecution and the possible death penalty upon their return home.  As a 
result, some gay Arab asylum seekers have committed suicide.127 
 
 120.  Arslan Yuzgun, Homosexuality and Police Terror in Turkey, 24 J. OF HOMOSEXUALITY159, 164 
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 121.  Id. at 167. 
 122.  MacDonald, supra note 48, at 45. 
 123.  WHITAKER, supra note 5, at 60. 
 124.  Id. at 18. 
 125.  See id. at 27. 
 126.  U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, CONVENTION AND PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF 
REFUGEES 3 (2011). 
 127.  WHITAKER, supra note 5, at 33. 
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III. INTERNATIONAL LGBT HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ARAB WORLD? 
As the previous section of this note indicates, there are some legitimate 
concerns with regards to the human rights of LGBT people, and those that 
perform homosexual acts, in the Arab world, including torture, humiliation, 
criminalization, and even execution in some circumstances.  These concerns have 
mobilized several international leaders and other people in the international 
human rights community, with many calling for the application of international 
human rights principles to LGBT people in the region.  Most recently, the United 
Nations(UN) Human Rights Council held a panel in Geneva in March 2012 on 
the issue of “[d]iscriminatory laws and practices and acts of violence against 
individuals based on their sexual orientation and gender identity.”128  The panel 
discussion, which was sponsored by South Africa and Brazil, was moderated by 
the Ambassador of South Africa and featured panelists from Brazil, Pakistan, 
Sweden and the United States.129  The panel arose out of the UN Human Rights 
Council resolution 17/19 from June 2011 that expressed “grave concern” about 
acts of violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender 
identity.130  The resolution requested the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
to prepare a report on “how international human rights law can be used to end 
violence and related human rights violations based on sexual orientation and 
gender identity,”131 and called for a panel discussion at the nineteenth session of 
the Human Rights Council to discuss the findings of the report in a 
“constructive, informed and transparent dialogue.”132  All of the panelists, and 
the majority of the countries that made statements during the proceedings, called 
for the application of universal human rights principles to LGBT people (the 
approach advocated by the Yogyakarta Principles, which will be discussed in more 
depth shortly), under which “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity 
and rights”.133  Multiple nations pointed out that they were not requesting the 
creation of new rights for LGBT people, but rather advocating that LGBT people 
be able to enjoy all the same rights that everyone else in their societies enjoys 
(and many times, takes for granted).134 
The panel conversation is the continuation of a recent push over the past 
year for international LGBT rights in many parts of the world.  For example, 
President Obama recently released a Presidential Memorandum entitled 
International Initiatives to Advance the Human Rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and 
Transgender Persons, which stated: “[t]he struggle to end discrimination against 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) persons is a global challenge, and 
 
 128.  U.N. HUM. RTS. COUNCIL, PANEL ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY, 
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 129.  Id. 
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one that is central to the United States’ commitment to promoting human 
rights.”135  This position was reinforced by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary 
Rodham Clinton, who stated: “Gay rights are human rights, and human rights 
are gay rights, once and for all.”136  While these documents are directed at LGBT 
discrimination all over the world, the Arab world is certainly a focal part of the 
conversation.137 
The past few decades have seen the rise of a global gay rights movement.  
As Carl Stychin, a Professor at City Law School in London, discusses: 
In the past decade, a ‘“double movement of globalization”‘ has 
taken place in the realm of gay rights.  On the one hand, a 
globalization of human rights has occurred, whereby human 
rights have become a key criterion by which the “progress” of 
nations is evaluated.  On the other hand, there has been a 
globalization of same-sex sexualities as identities.138 
Sonya Katyal, a Professor at Fordham Law, further comments that “the struggle 
for gay civil rights is becoming more global”139 and that “[g]ay and lesbian 
organizations now exist in virtually every continent and in many major urban 
centers throughout the world.”140 
As a result of this global movement towards international LGBT rights, in 
2007 a group of human rights experts launched the Yogyakarta Principles: 
 
 135.  Presidential Memorandum on International Initiatives to Advance the Human Rights of 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Persons, 2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. (Dec. 6, 2011), 
available at www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/12/06/presidential-memorandum-
international-initiatives-advance-human-rights-l. 
 136.  U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, Factsheet: U.S. Dept. of State Engagement on the Human Rights of Lesbian, 
Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender People, available at www.humanrights.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2011/12/20111214-dos-lgbt-factsheet.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2012).  The factsheet 
emphasizes the Department of State’s active work and leadership in protecting LGBT people through 
human rights promotion, including: 
 Engaging bilaterally and regionally in conjunction with U.S. embassies, civil society, and 
multilateral agencies to encourage countries to repeal or reform laws that criminalize LGBT 
conduct or status. 
 Reinforcing the human rights of LGBT people in multilateral fora, such as the UN Human 
Rights Council (HRC). . . . 
 Promoting human rights worldwide. . . . 
 Supporting LGBT human rights defenders and civil society groups, with programmatic and 
financial assistance, including efforts to document human rights violations; build advocacy 
skills; provide advocates with legal representation; and, when necessary, relocation 
support. 
 Reporting on the conditions of human rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people 
in each of its annual, country-specific Human Rights Reports. 
 Strengthening the Department’s personnel and consular policies. . . . 
 Protecting LGBT refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants through a protection strategy 
developed with other U.S. Government agencies, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
and NGOs. 
 137.  Id. at 13–15. 
 138.  Carl F. Stychin, Same-Sex Sexualities and the Globalization of Human Rights Discourse, 49 
MCGILL L. J. 951, 951 (2004). 
 139.  Sonia Katyal, Exporting Identity, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 97, 99 (2002). 
 140.  Id. at 98. 
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Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual 
Orientation and Gender Identity, providing the most comprehensive effort to apply 
international human rights law principles to LGBT people around the world.141  
As the Introduction to the Yogyakarta Principles begins:  
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.  
All human rights are universal, interdependent, indivisible and 
interrelated.  Sexual orientation and gender identity are integral 
to every person’s dignity and humanity and must not be the 
basis for discrimination or abuse.142  
Thus, at the core of the Yogyakarta Principles are the human rights norms of 
universality and non-discrimination.  The Principles then discuss that while 
[m]any advances have been made toward ensuring that people 
of all sexual orientations and gender identities can live with the 
equal dignity and respect to which all persons are entitled. . . . 
[n]evertheless, human rights violations targeted toward persons 
because of their actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender 
identity constitute a global and entrenched pattern of serious 
concern.  They include extra-judicial killings, torture and ill-
treatment, sexual assault and rape, invasions of privacy, 
arbitrary detention, denial of employment and education 
opportunities, and serious discrimination in relation to the 
enjoyment of other human rights.143 
The Introduction then continues that to address these concerns, “a 
consistent understanding of the comprehensive regime of international human 
rights law and its application to issues of sexual orientation and gender identity 
is necessary.”144  The Introduction finally concludes that the Yogyakarta 
Principles: 
address a broad range of human rights standards and their 
application to issues of sexual orientation and gender 
identity. . . . affirm the primary obligation of States to implement 
human rights. . . . affirm binding international legal standards 
with which all States must comply. . . . [and] promise a different 
future where all people born free and equal in dignity and rights 
can fulfill that precious birthright.145 
After this introduction and background, the Principles then officially begin 
with a Preamble, which emphasizes many of the same points discussed in the 
Introduction, but in a shorter, more formalized fashion.146  After the Preamble, 
 
 141.  O’Flaherty & Fisher, supra note 9, at 207. 
 142.  YOGYAKARTA PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, at 6. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. at 7. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. at 8–9.  The Preamble includes short statements such as: 
 RECALLING that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights, and that 
everyone is entitled to the enjoyment of human rights without distinction of any kind. . . . 
 DISTURBED that violence, harassment, discrimination, exclusion, stigmatisation and 
prejudice are directed against persons in all regions of the world because of their sexual 
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the Yogyakarta Principles then list twenty-nine principles, each of which 
“comprises a statement of international human rights law, its application to a 
given situation and an indication of the nature of the State’s duty to implement 
the legal obligation.”147  As Michael O’Flaherty and John Fisher discuss, there is 
an order to the principles: 
 
Principle Emphasis
1-3  Principles of the universality of 
human rights and their application 
to all personal without 
discrimination. 
 Right of all people to recognition 
before the law.
4-11  Fundamental rights to life, freedom 
from violence and torture, privacy, 
access to justice and freedom from 
arbitrary detention.
12-18  Non-discrimination in the enjoyment 
of economic, social and cultural 
rights, including employment, 
accommodation, social security, 
education and health.
19-21  Freedom to express oneself, one’s 
identity and one’s sexuality, without 
State interference based on sexual 
orientation or gender identity. 
 Rights to participate peaceably in 
public assemblies and events and 
otherwise associate in community 
with others.
22-23  Rights of persons to seek asylum from 
persecution based on sexual 
orientation or gender identity.
24-26  Rights of persons to participate in 
family life, public affairs and the 
cultural life of their community, 
without discrimination based on 
sexual orientation or gender identity. 
 
orientation or gender identity . . . 
 OBSERVING that international human rights law affirms that all persons, regardless of sexual 
orientation or gender identity, are entitled to the full enjoyment of all human rights . . . 
 RECOGNISING that there is significant value in articulating in a systematic manner 
international human rights law as applicable to the lives and experiences of persons of 
diverse sexual orientations and gender identities . . .” etc. (emphasis in original). 
 147.  O’Flaherty & Fisher, supra note 8, at 234. 
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27  Right to defend and promote human 
rights without discrimination based 
on sexual orientation and gender 
identity. 
 Obligation of States to ensure the 
protection of human rights defenders 
working in these areas. 
28-29 Importance of holding rights 
violators accountable and ensuring 
appropriate redress for those who 
face rights violations.148 
 
Overall, the Yogyakarta Principles are meant to be a comprehensive reflection 
of the current status of international human rights law as it could potentially 
apply to sexual orientation and gender identity.  According to O’Flaherty and 
Fisher, the Principles have been “met with a surprising degree of success”149 and 
are “increasingly cited in the international human rights system.”150  Other 
scholars attribute this apparent success of the Principles to the fact that they 
de-mystify the large and very legalistic array of international 
human rights treaties, jurisprudence, and procedural actions.  
They distill hundreds of pages of documents reflecting decades 
of advocacy and scholarship into 29 basic principles that 
emanate from two fundamental, and interlocking, human rights 
concepts: 1) that human rights law must be universally applied if 
it is to have any integrity at all, and 2) that every person has the 
right to be treated with respect and to be free from social and 
legal discrimination because of who they are.151 
Accordingly, several scholars have also called for the application of the 
Yogyakarta Principles to the Arab world, saying that “‘Queer Muslims’ should 
widely use the platform of the Yogyakarta Principles to frame their human rights 
demands, based on international human rights law.”152 
However, while the Principles may be experiencing success in some parts of 
the world since their release, they certainly have not been without serious 
detractors, and not surprisingly, many of these detractors are from the Arab 
world.  In particular, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) has been 
passionately opposed to the application of international human rights principles 
to LGBT people because the OIC does not believe that human rights violations 
based on sexual orientation or gender identity constitute legitimate areas of 
human rights concern.  At the most recent UN Human Rights Council panel in 
 
 148.  Id. at 234–35. 
 149.  Id. at 238. 
 150.  Hamzić, supra note 11, at 250. 
 151.  Paula L. Ettelbrick & Alia Trabucco Zerán, The Impact of the Yogyakarta Principles on 
International Human Rights Law Development , at 60 (Sept. 10, 2010), available at www.ypinaction.org 
/files/02/57/ Yogyakarta_Principles _Impact_Tracking_Report.pdf. 
 152.  Hamzić, supra note 11, at 270. 
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March 2012 on sexual orientation and gender identity, several Arab and Islamic 
states walked out of the panel,153 and the OIC, as well as Mauritania, on behalf of 
the Arab group, expressed their complete opposition to the findings and 
recommendations of the UN High Commissioner’s report and to the general 
work of the UN Human Rights Council to promote international human rights 
for LGBT people.154  During the panel, the OIC described homosexuality as 
“licentious behavior,” and emphasized that sexual orientation has no clear 
definition and should not be introduced into the UN human rights framework.155  
The OIC also expressed concern that such efforts may lead to the social 
normalization and the legitimization of many “deplorable acts” such as 
pedophilia and incest, and the OIC called on the Council to demonstrate 
sensitivity to different cultural and social common belief systems and to refrain 
from promoting national or regional values or norms that do not enjoy 
international consensus.156  Mauritania, in addition, said that “the controversial 
topic of sexual orientation” would undermine discussion in the Council of all 
“genuine human rights problems,” and that the Council’s work posed a serious 
challenge to cultural pluralism and constituted a breach of the right of states and 
communities to promote their own well-established value systems.157  
Ultimately, Mauritania stated that the focus on homosexuals was totally 
extraneous to the human rights system because the UN is not required to deal 
with a person’s individual choices and personal likes and dislikes.158  Such 
statements demonstrate that the Arab world’s opposition to applying 
international human rights principles to LGBT people is still unwavering, and 
continues to hold strong in 2013. 
These statements and actions are the continuation of a longstanding effort 
by the Arab world, and the OIC in particular, to shut down any potential 
proposals to discuss international human rights for LGBT people.  As various 
resolutions or statements have been raised in the UN over the past decade 
regarding international human rights and sexual orientation/gender identity, the 
OIC has consistently denounced such efforts, asserting that “[sexual orientation] 
is not a human rights issue.”159  For example, when a resolution on human rights 
and sexual orientation was presented by the Brazilian delegation before the UN 
Commission on Human Rights in 2003, the OIC brought a “no action” motion 
and then threatened to boycott an upcoming Arab-Latin American trade 
summit.160  Then, five years later, Argentina delivered a historic statement on 
human rights, sexual orientation, and gender identity at the 63rd session of the 
UN General Assembly, and the OIC immediately responded with a statement, 
 
 153.  Robert Evans, Islamic States, Africans Walk Out On U.N. Gay Panel, REUTERS (Mar. 8, 2012, 
1:35 PM), www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/07/un-gays-idAFL5E8E778Z20120307. 
 154.  U.N. HUM. RTS. COUNCIL, PANEL ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY, supra note 
128. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  Ignacio Saiz, Bracketing Sexuality: Human Rights and Sexual Orientation – A Decade of Dev. and 
Denial at the UN 12 (Sexual Policy Watch, Working Paper No. 2, 2005). 
 160.  Hamzić, supra note 11, at 245. 
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delivered by Syria, on behalf of 57 states.161  The statement denied sexual 
orientation and gender identity as cognizable grounds of discrimination, and 
expressed a fear that the recognition of these categories could “legitimize many 
deplorable acts, such as paedophilia”162 (an argument, as discussed earlier, that 
was reiterated by the OIC again in 2012 during the UN Human Rights Council 
panel on sexual orientation and gender identity).  Needless to say, many 
countries in the Arab world are not receptive to the spirit behind the Yogyakarta 
Principles. 
Apart from this opposition on the international human rights stage, the 
approach of applying an international gay human rights framework, and of 
using open gay rights advocacy, has also been met with criticism and opposition 
from scholars.  One of the most notable and outspoken critics is Joseph Massad 
of Columbia University, who has called the promotion of gay rights in Arab 
countries an imperialist-style “missionary” project in which the “Gay 
International” forces the Arab to subscribe to a heterosexual/homosexual binary, 
thus “heterosexualising” him because when only given the choice to be one or 
the other, heterosexuality will be the option dictated by cultural norms.163  
Massad’s “Gay International” “both produces . . . gays and lesbians, where they 
do not exist and represses same-sex desires and practices that refuse to be 
assimilated into its sexual epistemology.”164  The “Gay International,” according 
to Massad, also “incites discourse,” because “same-sex contact between men has 
not been a topic of government or journalistic discourse in the Arab world of the 
last two centuries’”.165  This discourse, Massad continues, “assumes 
prediscursively that homosexuals, gays, and lesbians are universal categories 
that exist everywhere in the world, and based on this prediscursive axiom, the 
Gay International . . . demands that their rights as ‘homosexuals’ be granted 
where they are denied. . . .”166  This missionary campaign will also produce 
effects that are less than liberating for supposed “gay” people in the Arab world, 
Massad argues, because: 
men who are considered the passive or receptive parties in male-
male sexual contacts are forced to have one object choice and 
identify as homosexual or gay, just as men who are the ‘“active’” 
partners are also forced to limit their sexual aim to one object 
choice, women or men. . . . The so-called passive homosexual 
whom the Gay International wants to defend against social 
denigration will find himself in a double bind: first, his sexual 
desires will be unfulfilled because he will no longer have access 
to his previously available sexual object choice (i.e., exclusively 
active partners, as in the interim they will have become 
 
 161.  Press Release, Dept. of Pub. Info., General Assembly Adopts 52 Resolutions, 6 Decisions 
Recommended by Third Committee on Wide Range of Human Rights, Social, Humanitarian Issues, 
U.N. Press Release GA/10801 (Dec. 18, 2008), available at www.un.org/ News/Press/docs/2008/ 
ga10801.doc.htm. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Massad, supra note 12, at 361–62, 383–85 
 164. Id. at 363. 
 165. Id. at 374. 
 166. Id. at 363. 
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heterosexual); and second, he will fall victim to legal and police 
persecution as well as heightened social denigration as his 
sexual practice becomes a topic of public discourse that 
transforms it from a practice into an identity.167 
In short, Massad argues that “by exporting gay identity, this movement imposes 
the binary hetero/homo division on a society in which it does not exist, and 
incites discourse on homosexuality in a way that will actually make same-sex sex 
less feasible.”168 
Lying at the base of Massad’s critique is the idea that the push for 
international LGBT rights in the Arab world (the so-called missionary project of 
Massad’s “Gay International”) is a Western, orientalist imposition.  Sabine 
Schmidtke seconds this notion, saying that “[a]ny attempt to form a movement 
for gay rights in the Islamic world is seen as yet another symptom of 
‘Westernization.’”169 Similarly, as Nabil Osman, the Egyptian government’s 
spokesperson, told the New York Times in 2003, “[Homosexuality] is not accepted 
here, and everybody should accept that what is good for America or for Europe 
may not be good for another place.”170  The idea of gay identity in the Arab 
world is thus “deeply fraught with accusations of cultural inauthenticity and 
Western decadence”171 and “often attacked as a ‘threatening imperialist 
import;’”172 discussions on the topic “represent part of an age-old conflict 
between cultural sovereignty, modernity, human rights, and tradition.”173 
This type of “[c]ultural protectionism”174 against the West and what may be 
perceived as Western-imposed ideas may be particularly palpable in the sexual 
arena because of the West’s sexual exploitation of the colonized, in which the 
dominant white male tourist gave “vent to his own desires at the expense of the 
Maghrebins.”175  Many sexually repressed Westerners came to the Arab world in 
search of an alternative sexual outlet and in particular, homosexual tourists (but 
many heterosexual tourists as well), including writers, artists, and general 
travelers.  They came to this region of the world in search of what Edward Said 
describes as “sexual experience unobtainable in Europe” and a “different type of 
sexuality.”176  By exploring this new type of sexuality, these tourists opened up a 
“Pandora’s box of phantasmic homoerotic desire.”177  However, many 
homosexual men came to the Arab world in search of sexual gratification 
because, “[s]exually exiled from the repressiveness of the home culture . . . , 
 
 167.  Id. at 383–85. 
 168.  Aeyal Gross, Queer Theory and International Human Rights Law: Does Each Person Have A 
Sexual Orientation?, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS 12 (2007). 
 169.  Schmidtke, supra note 20, at 260. 
 170.  Egyptian Government Denies Gay Crackdown, DATA LOUNGE (Apr. 4, 2003), 
www.glapn.org/sodomylaws/world/egypt/egnews211.htm. 
 171.  Katyal, supra note 139, at 122. 
 172.  Id. at 126. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  WHITAKER, supra note 5, at 11. 
 175.  Robert Aldrich, The French in North Africa, in COLONIALISM AND HOMOSEXUALITY 329, 337 
(2003). 
 176.  Boone, supra note 25, at 89. 
 177.  Id. at 93. 
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homosexuals have searched instead for fulfilment [sic] in the realm of the 
foreign.”178  Their status as “other” at home does not diminish either the power 
dynamics that still have existed between them and their Arab sexual partners or 
their ability to exploit the colonized abroad.  Joseph Boone, a Professor of Gender 
Studies at the University of Southern California, explains this idea clearly, 
stating:  
In narratives where the occidental traveler by virtue of his 
homosexuality is already the other, the presumed equivalence of 
Eastern homosexuality and occidental personal liberation may 
disguise the specter of colonial privilege and exploitation 
encoded in the hierarchy white man/brown boy.179  
  Sexual tourism in the Arab world, in general, cannot escape these 
established structures of power because the Arab world has almost always been 
seen as inferior in such relations.  In fact, as Edward Said discusses in 
Orientalism, the Arabic Orient has come to represent “one [of the West’s] most 
recurring images of the Other” in which the West effeminizes the East in such a 
way that it becomes “sexually available so that it can be penetrated, cataloged, 
and thus contained by the ‘superior’ rationality of the Western mind.”180  So even 
when the white homosexual man has been the “other” at home and goes to the 
Arab world in search of sexual liberation from the oppression he feels at home, 
this notion still involves power dynamics between the dominant white male 
tourist and the submissive Arab local, in which the western tourist’s presumed 
superiority and assumed authority to narrate the situation leads to the 
exploitation and oppression of the Arab man.  Such notions only further 
reinforce the idea that an openly gay identity and LGBT liberation is a Western 
import the Arab world should protect against. 
Running through the currents of these critiques, as well as through the 
earlier discussions on homosexuality and homoeroticism in the Arab world, is 
the notion that defining one’s personal sexual identity in line with the 
performance of same-sex sexual conduct simply may not be a relevant or salient 
concept in the Arab world.  This idea is focal to Sonia Katyal’s discussion of 
same-sex sexual identities in a global context, where a “divergence between 
identity and conduct raises the difficult question of whether sexual orientation 
itself is a culturally specific concept.”181  As Katyal notes, “some cultures view 
homosexuality as an activity, not an identity.”182 Moreover, although over the 
past few decades there has been an emergence of openly self-identifying gay and 
lesbian individuals, who define their public sexual identity along the lines of 
their sexual orientations, 
many Western activists and scholars often fail to recognize that 
arguments for legal protection on the basis of sexual orientation 
often collide with, rather than incorporate, these preexisting 
social meanings of same-sex sexual activity.  In other words, the 
 
 178.  JARROD HAYES, QUEER NATIONS: MARGINAL SEXUALITIES IN THE MAGHREB 29 (2000). 
 179.  Boone, supra note 25, at 104. 
 180.  Id. at 92. 
 181.  Katyal, supra note 139, at 99. 
 182.  Id. at 99–100. 
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presumed equation between sexual conduct, sexual orientation, 
and sexual identity, so prevalent in Western legal thought, tends 
to swiftly unravel when viewed in a cross-cultural framework.183 
Underlying Katyal’s argument is the idea that focusing on sexual identity-
based protections, which are not always palpable to some cultures, can be very 
limiting and may end up excluding a large number of sexual minorities that do 
not view sexuality through this lens.184  While Katyal’s discussion is primarily 
grounded in examples from India and Thailand, the frameworks she describes 
appear in many ways to be applicable to the Arab world context as well, and 
merit further discussion. 
Katyal begins her discussion by analyzing different models of sexuality that 
examine the relationship between sexual identity and sexual conduct.  The first 
model she looks at, which she describes as “the most prominent model of gay 
civil rights,”185 is the substitutive model.  This model “assumes that one’s public 
sexual identity and private sexual conduct are interchangeable; that is, 
individuals who engage in same-sex sexual conduct can be legally classified by a 
fixed and clearly demarcable gay, lesbian, or bisexual sexual identity.”186  Thus, 
the substitutive model conflates sexual conduct, sexual orientation, and sexual 
identity.  Katyal uses the term substitutive for the model because it implies a 
legal, as well as a personal, interchangeability between sexual conduct and 
sexual identity.  As Katyal further expounds: 
First, at its most basic level, proponents of this model presume 
that the gender of one’s object choice determines a person’s 
sexual orientation.  Second, the model also presumes that a 
person’s subjective sexual orientation comprises a foundational 
and central aspect of a person’s sexual identity.  Third, and most 
significantly, this model also assumes the interchangeability (or 
“substitutive” nature) of gay sexual identity, orientation, and 
conduct.187 
Thus, Katyal argues, the success of the model depends on “propagating a 
model of ‘gay personhood’ or ‘gay essentialism’ which presume[s] the 
universality of a number of principles involving sexuality, sexual orientation, 
and sexual identity,”188 so within this context, “the performance of same-sex 
sexual behavior, however slight or occasional, is assumed to indicate a universal 
essence and meaning.”189 
The substitutive model, which appears to be widely used in the discussions 
about LGBT sexual identities and legal rights in Western countries, also frames 
the discussion about LGBT human rights cases in the international context in a 
particularized manner, where open expression of identity becomes essential for 
the progress of international LGBT rights.  As Katyal explains: 
 
 183.  Id. at 100. 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  Id. at 101. 
 186.  Id. 
 187.  Id. at 109. 
 188.  Id. at 108. 
 189.  Id. 
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Because such cases often depend upon an identity that is not 
immediately visible . . . the identity—gay, lesbian, bisexual—
must be expressed in order to become cognizable . . . .Under this 
substitutive relationship between identity, conduct, and 
expression, ‘coming out’ is largely viewed as an essential, 
political instrument to build a community instead of a largely 
personal decision.190 
Under the substitutive model, the focus on an outward expression of a gay 
or lesbian identity becomes a “categorical imperative,”191 to building a public, 
collective gay identity, and diverges greatly from the idea of sexuality as simply 
an activity. 
Even though Katyal acknowledges the predominance of the substitutive 
model in the discussions about international LGBT rights, she finds that this 
monopoly power over sexual self-definition can also be deeply 
problematic . . .  Categories of gay, lesbian, heterosexual, or 
bisexual identity, as a basis for individual and collective identity, 
often obscure a deeper question of whether such categories of 
sexual orientation can—or should—serve as universal categories 
for everyone.”192   
In particular, she thinks that “imposing a gay, lesbian, or bisexual identity on 
individuals who may engage in same-sex sexual behavior, but who do not fit a 
substitutive paradigm between identity and conduct, can be unduly confining, 
exclusionary, and inappropriate.”193  Apart from the argument that sexual acts in 
and of themselves have no inherent meaning,194 Katyal argues that “[s]ince 
sexual acts carry different meanings in different cultural and temporal contexts, 
it is largely impossible to universalize clear definitions of identity, and the 
relationship between act and identity is not nearly as ‘fixed’ as the model of gay 
personhood presupposes.”195 
Katyal’s main premise is that the overreliance on this substitutive model of 
sexual identity is problematic for a variety reasons.  First, the idea of a universal 
paradigm for sexual identity, which then becomes promoted as a universal 
global human rights fixture, renders all sexual acts, regardless of their 
motivations, as having similar significance in global civil rights terms.196  This is 
particularly problematic for people that participate in same-sex acts, but do not 
identify as gay, lesbian, or bisexual.  These people “may regard themselves as 
‘heterosexuals,’ ‘straights,’ or just ‘human beings’ who on occasion participate in 
homoerotic encounters for various reasons, including pleasure, money, social 
expectations, and the absence of other sexual opportunities.”197  Second, by 
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 194.  Steven Epstein, Gay Politics, Ethnic Identity: The Limits of Social Constructionism, in SOCIAL 
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 195.  Katyal, supra note 139, at 115. 
 196.  Id. at 129. 
 197.  GILBERT HERDT, SAME SEX, DIFFERENT CULTURES 4 (Westview Press, 1997). 
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establishing such a universal paradigm, the substitutive paradigm does not 
include or accommodate the complexity of potential meanings and 
identifications that are related to same-sex sexual acts, thus marginalizing many 
individuals that do not follow this dominant paradigm, particularly in cross-
cultural contexts.198  Third, international actors that promote the substantive 
model many times fail to question “whether one’s sexual orientation universally 
– and necessarily – comprises a central aspect of personhood.”199  This is a 
particularly important question when people from other cultures may view the 
intersections between sexual desire, behavior, and identity differently.200  The 
substitutive model appears to presume that an equation between public sexual 
identity (“coming out”) and private sexual behavior is the only proper way to 
conceive these concepts.201  Finally, the substitutive model overwhelming favors 
the visibility and politicization of sexual identity, and privileges certain 
formations of sexual identity over others.  There is an assumption that increased 
visibility is a successful formula for combating homophobia, heterosexism, 
misconceptions about LGBT people, etc.,202 but, as will be discussed shortly, such 
visibility can backfire, and may actually turn “out” gay people into targets.  
Ultimately, Katyal’s critique highlights the problems and dangers that arise with 
the substitutive model, while questioning whether such a model or “formula”203 
is always translatable, a critical question to consider when evaluating the 
substitutive model’s potential applicability and relevance to the Arab world. 
IV. AFTER THE ARAB SPRING: AN OPPORTUNITY FOR OPEN LGBT RIGHTS 
ADVOCACY? 
After looking at the model of “gay rights as international human rights,” 
fueled by the global gay rights movement and the Yogyakarta Principles, and 
then exploring critiques of such a model by several scholars, most notably Joseph 
Massad and Sonya Katyal, it appears that this model may not be the most 
appropriate for the Arab world.  But where does this conclusion leave us?  
Rather than just criticizing the push for international LGBT human rights, is 
there not some other way to address what are very serious human rights 
concerns?  Some have looked to the series of protests and revolutions in the Arab 
world over the past year, known collectively as the “Arab Spring” or “Arab 
Awakening,” as a momentous opportunity to promote the international human 
rights agenda for Arab LGBT people.  There is an idea that this ‘“new wave of 
freedom”‘204 will benefit LGBT people in the region. As Khaled, a twenty-two 
year-old Egyptian biology student stated: “As a gay Arab, I feel represented in 
 
 198.  Katyal, supra note 139, at 129. 
 199.  Id. at 130. 
 200.  See id. 
 201.  Id. 
 202.  John Clark et al., Introduction to THE THIRD PINK BOOK: A GLOBAL VIEW OF LESBIAN AND GAY 
LIBERATION AND OPPRESSION 17 (Aart Hendriks et al. eds., 1993). 
 203.  Katyal, supra note 139, at 131. 
 204.  Hossein Alizadeh, 100 Years of International Women’s Day: Will the “New Middle East” Be a 
Welcoming Place for Gays and Lesbians?, TRUSTLAW (Mar. 6, 2011, 5:08 PM), 
www.trust.org/trustlaw/blogs/100-years-of-international-womens-day/will-the-new-middle-east-
be-a-welcoming-place-for-gays-and-lesbians/. 
Needham Research Edit 3 (Do Not Delete) 9/11/2013  11:14 AM 
 AFTER THE ARAB SPRING 315 
these protests in every way and I’m confident that one day there will be a gay 
rights movement sweeping the Arab streets.”205  Most notably, scholar Hassan El 
Menyawi, who has been against open “Stonewall” gay rights advocacy206 
because it proved to be ineffective and made him a target for torture from the 
Egyptian government, has also looked upon the Arab Spring with a renewed 
rejuvenation: 
[T]he peoples of the Middle East have arisen.  Across the Middle 
East, people have stood up to brutal tyrants.  They stood up to 
their fear.  In Bahrain, troops openly fired into crowds of 
protesters.  In Libya, the military has repeatedly shot mourners 
at the funerals of other victims, and military jets are dropping 
aerial bombs into public demonstrations.  But the people do not 
return home cowering in fear as they did when I was young.  
Instead, trembling and anxiety-ridden, they rush back to the 
center squares, crying out their peaceful chants in defiance of 
their tyrants. . . . I look at the Middle East with renewed 
excitement, planning my return and imagining new futures for 
gay rights.207 
However, while the Arab Spring has certainly brought dramatic changes to 
the region - politically, socially, and even culturally - there is good reason to 
doubt that now is the best time to push for LGBT rights in the region.  In 
particular, the Arab Spring has seen the rise of Islamist groups,208 who, to put it 
simply, are not receptive to the international human rights framework for LGBT 
people.209  Most recently, Tunisia’s prime minister for human rights, Samir Dilou, 
attacked the existence of an online gay magazine called Gayday Magazine, 
saying, “freedom of expression has limits.  [LGBT people] live as citizens but 
they must respect the red lines set up by our religion, heritage and 
civilization.”210  Dilou continued, saying that homosexuality is a “sexual 
 
 205.  Simba Shani Kamaria Russeau, A Touch of Spring for LGBT Arabs, INTER PRESS SERVICE (Jan. 
11, 2012), www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=106405; see also Londono, supra note 15, at 1 (“Here in 
Egypt, gays and lesbians have turned a handful of public venues into spaces where it’s safe for men 
to dance with men and where women sit on each other’s laps.  And activists are quietly putting 
together campaigns they hope will enable gays and lesbians to live openly in a country where sexual 
minorities have long been ostracized.”). 
 206.  Infra p.316-19. 
 207.  Hassan El Menyawi, Egyptian Gay-Rights Expert Reflects on the Mideast Revolutions, EDGE ON 
THE NET (Mar. 1, 2011), www.edgeonthenet.com/index.php?ch=news&sc =&sc3=&id=116835 
[hereinafter “Egyptian Gay Rights”]. 
 208.  See John M. Owen IV, Why Islamism is Winning, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2012), available at 
www.nytimes.com/2012/01/07/opinion/why-islamism-is-winning.html (“Rather than bringing 
secular revolutionaries to power, the Arab Spring is producing flowers of a decidedly Islamist hue.  
More unsettling to many, Islamists are winning fairly: religious parties are placing first in free, open 
elections in Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt.”). 
 209.  See Londono, supra note 15, at 2 (“[F]or Bidak and many other Egyptian gays, the 
enthusiasm has fizzled.  Islamists, all but certain to become politically powerful in the coming 
elections, have been calling for a strict religious state; dogmatic politicians have been ascendant in 
Tunisia, which is among the most liberal of Arab nations.”). 
 210.  Dan Littauer, Tunisia rights minister pledges to deny freedom to gays, GAY STAR NEWS (Feb. 6, 
2012), www.gaystarnews.com/article/tunisia-rights-minister-pledges-deny-freedom-gays. 
Needham Research Edit 3 (Do Not Delete) 9/11/2013  11:14 AM 
316 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 20:287 2013 
perversion” that needs to be “treated medically.”211  Amnesty International 
responded to Dilou’s statements with a letter that demanded the public 
retraction of his “damaging and discriminatory comments about 
homosexuality,”212 urged for the repeal of Article 230 of the Tunisian Criminal 
Code that makes consensual sexual acts between members of the same sex a 
criminal offense, and reminded Dilou that homosexuality “stopped being seen as 
an illness or ‘perversion‘ by world medical organizations and associations 
decades ago.”213  In response, Dilou simply reiterated the same position through 
his press secretary, who stated, “Dilou believes that Tunisia’s distinctiveness as 
an Arab-Muslim society must be respected . . . .”214  This situation is a very recent 
example of the opposition LGBT people, or the idea of an open LGBT sexual 
identity, still faces.  This opposition from Islamist groups, along with the 
problems that the substitutive model poses for sexual identity in the Arab world, 
presents some serious challenges to an international LGBT rights movement in 
the region. 
All hope is not lost, however.  The aftermath of the Arab Spring is still 
playing out, and comments from people like Dilou demonstrate that, rather than 
being swept under the rug never to be spoken of again, issues of homosexuality 
and sexual identity are gaining more exposure and prominence in the Arab 
world, even if the immediate result is backlash.  That being said, because the 
effects of the Arab Spring are still developing and the social foundations of the 
Arab world are slowly reforming, now is not the time to push for the application 
of the Yogyakarta Principles and international human rights for LGBT people.  
Such a movement, for the time being, will be flatly rejected by the Islamist 
groups in the Arab world that have risen to power, and will likely be ineffective 
amongst Arab people because it is premised on what will be perceived as an 
imperialist, substitutive model for sexual identity that will not gain much 
traction in the Arab world.  So, where does that leave us, and what can be done? 
There are other potential approaches to tackling the complexities of sexual 
identity and human rights in the Arab world.  While the Arab Spring may have 
provoked him to reevaluate his ideas for advocacy,215 Hassan El Menyawi had 
previously presented an interesting advocacy approach for LGBT people, or 
those that participate in same-sex sexual activity, which he deemed “activism 
from the closet.”216  The “activism from the closet” approach involves not 
explicitly advocating for LGBT rights, but rather advocating for issues that, while 
not categorically “gay rights” issues, will greatly benefit LGBT people or those 
that participate in same-sex sexual acts.217  Thus, the “activism from the closet” 
model is a more subtle approach to gay rights advocacy because it attempts to 
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persuade people on important issues that indirectly benefit LGBT people and 
those that participate in same-sex acts. The model most notably focuses on 
heightened privacy protections.  It does not enunciate directly notions of LGBT 
rights and LGBT identity - notions that would be met with vehement opposition 
in much of the Arab world.218  In addition to presenting a more subtle approach 
to LGBT rights advocacy, “activism from the closet” also provides a model where 
the safety of LGBT people and those participating in same-sex acts is built in, 
because such activism does not involve being “out.”  Thus, rather than becoming 
a target for the government or other non-state actors, “[t]he closet, fluid, protean 
and hidden, becomes a safe locus for collective strategising – a place from which 
LGBTQ groups can engage in activism.”219 
The “activism from the closet” approach developed out of El Menyawi’s 
personal experiences in Egypt, where he saw firsthand the failure of the open 
model of LGBT advocacy.  Looking to the work of other (Western) gay rights 
organizations, El Menyawi adopted a “Stonewall“ model of advocacy, where he 
“pursued gay rights activism by openly speaking out through demonstrations 
and by publishing [his] ideas about how gay rights and Islam were 
reconcilable.”220  In the Stonewall model, “one’s sexual identity — being gay — is 
part of one’s being.  The key moment of identity formation is ‘coming out’ and 
declaring one’s being to others as part of a ‘political act.’”221  El Menyawi saw 
this model of advocacy as the dominant paradigm, and decided to follow suit: 
I internalised the ‘coming out’ narrative; I was an heir of the 
rainbow flag, the pride parade and, without knowing it at the 
time, of Stonewall.  In effect, I acted as a conduit for the 
dissemination of a notion of gay rights activism in which gay 
identity is a key part of an attempt to open spaces for gay 
Egyptians.222 
While such an internalization was certainly understandable, particularly 
when information about homosexuality has been repressed within most Arab 
countries for a long time and the dominant paradigm of open Stonewall 
advocacy may have been the only known path to follow, El Menyawi 
unfortunately became a target for the government, and experienced violence and 
torture as a result, including “beatings, being forced into small confined spaces, 
withholding of food or delivery of food with filth in it, electrocution, and 
rape.”223  El Menyawi soon realized that his efforts at open advocacy had 
backfired.224  Making a parallel to a Mahatma Gandhi quotation, “First they 
ignore you.  Then they laugh at you.  They then fight you.  Then you win,” El 
Menyawi found his path of advocacy had taken a different course: “First they 
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hear you.  Then they pursue you.  Then they harm you.  Then you lose.”225  
Ultimately, El Menyawi found his attempt at Stonewall advocacy made him a 
prime target for a government that could use him (and other “open” LGBT 
people) to distract the country from its dire economic straits, and to shore up the 
government’s Islamic credentials at a time that was seeing the slow rise in 
popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist group.226 
As a result, El Menyawi had to head back to the drawing board. Based on 
his experiences, it appeared that using the Stonewall model of advocacy and 
coming out of the closet to demonstrate and increase visibility was not a feasible 
approach, particularly “in a context wherein persecution, imprisonment and 
torture . . . persist[ed].”227  Instead of viewing the closet as a dominating symbol 
of oppression and suppression of one’s true identity (while simultaneously 
seeing coming out of the closet as the ultimate symbol of freedom and 
liberation), El Menyawi began to view the closet as a “location that provides a 
protective space — a space in which one may be free from the direct oppression 
of a dictatorial regime such as the Egyptian State.”228  This conception of the 
closet acknowledged the fact that: 
[w]hile the Stonewall model perceives the closet to be 
problematic as it does not allow for self-expression, the prospect 
of being violently attacked is surely much more problematic.  
The prospect of losing one’s life or being tortured outweighs the 
minimal expression benefits that ‘coming out of the closet’ 
brings, particularly considering that currently in Egypt there are 
officers standing outside the closet doors, waiting — waiting to 
apprehend, imprison and torture you.229 
El Menyawi’s conception of the closet as a safe space is not limited to a 
single individual seeking shelter from torture and abuse.  His advocacy model 
calls for a reconceptualization of the closet, in which the closet becomes a space 
that is inhabited by several self-identified LGBT people and their allies, “a 
location in which LBGTQ groups can meet one another by creating safe spaces in 
which to learn about one another without ‘coming out’ to the wider public; 
without being in visible locations within the reach of the state’s apparatus of 
violence.”230 
This closet forms the basis for his “activism from the closet” model, where 
“activism from the closet occurs by publicly hiding — covering — one’s gay 
identity outside of the collective closet, but still actively engaging in activism — 
hidden activism.”231  This hidden activism becomes crucial to El Menyawi’s 
advocacy model, and requires “that one does not explicitly enunciate ‘gay rights’ 
and ‘gay identity’ as part of gay rights activism, rather, that one should approach 
activism in more subtle ways, by persuading others on issues that appear to have 
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very little explicit connection with gay rights or gay identity.”232  More 
specifically, El Menyawi highlights a number of issues for which those in the 
closet can advocate, the most important issue being heightened privacy 
protections.   
Privacy rights are strongly protected by Islamic law,233 and are thus deeply 
respected by Islamist groups.  Privacy rights also would indirectly benefit LGBT 
people or those engaging in same-sex sexual acts by “preserving their bodily 
integrity, protecting them from violence, and allowing for the potential 
expansion of ‘the closet’.  Most of all, it would allow LBGTQ groups within the 
closet to sustain their closeted gay rights activism.”234 
While privacy rights are the focus of El Menyawi’s “activism from the 
closet” model, he also discusses other potential strategies to advocate for from 
the closet.  First, he suggests a promotion of the sciences, which in turn could 
point to the physiological explanations for homosexuality (as opposed religious 
ones).235  Second, he suggests diverting the public’s attention away from LGBT 
people by getting them to focus on other critical issues, such as the economy, 
democracy, etc.236  Finally, he recommends trying to produce and support a 
political party that is particularly concerned with secular issues.237 
El Menyawi first advocated for his “activism from the closet” model back in 
2006, several years before the Arab Spring occurred.  After the Arab Spring 
began to take flight, like other people, he was excited by the revolutionary 
changes occurring in the region and he began to reevaluate his advocacy model.  
As he succinctly stated: “No more activism from the closet.  Now begins an 
activism outside of the closet.”238  While his excitement and anxiety to push his 
advocacy model out of the closet is understandable, particularly given his tried 
history with LGBT rights advocacy in the region, now is not the time to abandon 
his “activism from the closet” model.  As discussed earlier, the Arab Spring has 
left the situation for LGBT people, as well as those who engage in same-sex 
activity, uncertain at best.  There is recent evidence of continued opposition, for 
example the statements made by Samir Dilou in Tunisia.  In light of the rise of 
Islamist groups in the region, commentators such as Michael Lucas from the 
Huffington Post believe that the “expectations raised by the Arab Spring will be 
hard to live up to; soon, the new governments will start looking for scapegoats 
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and distractions.  Gays have always played those roles too well.”239  Lucas looks 
to Iran after the Ayatollahs took over from the Shah during the Islamic 
revolution of 1979, and to the post-Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq; in both cases 
anti-gay violence and criminalization increased.240  Ultimately, Lucas thinks the 
idea that “the practical concerns of democracy—getting elected, building 
coalitions—will keep radical Islam in check . . . [is] deeply naïve,”241 and there is 
good reason to believe he is right.  The most recent UN Human Rights Council 
panel on sexual orientation and gender identity in March 2012, in which the OIC 
and the Arab group expressed continued staunch opposition to accommodating 
the “personal choices” of LGBT people’s “licentious behavior,” only further 
indicates that attitudes about homosexuality have not shifted much in the Arab 
world, even after the Arab Spring. 
As the aftermath of the Arab Spring continues to unfold over a year later, 
those interested in pursuing a model for advocacy for LGBT people or those that 
participate in same-sex activity would be wise to adopt El Menyawi’s “activism 
from the closet” model.  This model allows for important advocacy work to be 
done right now from safety, rather than waiting to see how things play out 
between Islamist leaders and open LGBT rights advocates post-Arab Spring.  
Advocacy for privacy is a strong strategy, particularly because, as described 
above, the right to privacy carries so much weight in Islamic law.  This bodes 
well when dealing with groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt or 
Ennahda in Tunisia.  As El Menyawi recently pointed out, “[e]ven though the 
Muslim Brotherhood has openly rejected the inclusion of gay rights in a new 
Egyptian constitution, they support broad human rights protections, such as 
outlawing torture and the universal right to privacy, which are likely to benefit 
LGBT people in the long-term.”242  Universal privacy and outlawing torture, 
then, are two great issues to advocate for from the closet. 
Advocating for the right to privacy before advocating for sexual identity-
based protections resonates with Katyal as well.  As discussed earlier, Katyal 
criticized the dominant LGBT rights paradigm, the substitutive model, for being 
too limiting and alienating for those people that do not equate sexual activity 
with sexual identity, among other things.  Instead, she advocates for a model that 
integrates the “additive” model, in which “one’s sexual identity—heterosexual, 
homosexual, or bisexual—can be entirely separated from one’s sexual conduct or 
desire,”243 with the “substitutive” model.244  This integrated model embraces 
terms such as “men who have sex with men” (MSM), allowing those who do not 
equate sexual conduct with sexual identity to enter the conversation,245 and 
under such a model, privacy protections become more important than sexual 
identity-based protections.  Using India as the primary example, Katyal notes 
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that: 
a strategy that focuses primarily on the right to privacy before 
identity-based protections allows an individual the autonomy to 
determine his or her sexual identity and preferences, instead of 
forcing them to adopt a particular identity in order to access 
constitutional protection.  In other words, by demanding the 
right to privacy, Indian activists are actually demanding the 
right to deliberate—and determine—the interior and exterior 
aspects of their sexual identity, for themselves, and not as a 
prerequisite for a particular legal entitlement.246 
In this way, El Menyawi’s “activism from the closet” model can be 
considered alongside Katyal’s integrated “additive/substitutive” model.  First, 
from the closet, advocates should try to expand the discussion about sexual 
identity in terms that are more relevant or salient to Arab culture.  Like in India, 
the term “MSM” may prove to be more relevant to Arab men, some of who 
participate in same-sex conduct but have no interest in defining themselves as 
“gay” or “homosexual,” especially in a fixed or permanent manner.  This type of 
identification then can go hand-in-hand with privacy because same-sex acts can 
happen in private without interference.  Second, such a model is less likely to be 
viewed as a Western or imperialist imposition because it is more accommodating 
of sexual identity differences in the Arab world. The model practically 
anticipates some of the major issues or backlash that could follow the use of an 
open “Stonewall” model of advocacy or a “gay rights as human rights” model in 
the region.  Third, the model also seems to harken back to the mode of sexuality 
that was occurring in the region before, as Massad puts it, the “Gay 
International” incited discourse about open LGBT human rights.  Regardless of 
one’s opinion on Massad’s view, strengthening privacy rights would, in turn, 
further strengthen the boundaries between the public and private spheres, a line 
that has been respected historically in the Arab world.  Particularly as post-Arab 
Spring life and culture develops, this model can address some of the concerns 
and complexities that arise when dealing with the intersections between sexual 
activity, sexual identity, and human rights concerns in the Arab world, at least 
for the time being. 
CONCLUSION 
The Arab world presents a number of complex issues with regards to same-
sex sexuality.  Many people from Western cultures associate homosexuality in 
the Arab world with complete oppression, torture, violence, etc.  While some of 
these occurrences are unfortunately true, the fact is that homosexual acts and 
homoeroticism have been occurring in the region for a long time, but in a very 
particularized fashion that is oftentimes based on power dynamics and the idea 
of collective denial.  Those that have deviated from these sexual norms, 
particularly those that have “come out of the closet,” have become the targets of 
state torture, humiliation, and violence.  This mistreatment has captured the 
attention of the international human rights community, which has called for the 
 
 246.  Id. at 166. 
Needham Research Edit 3 (Do Not Delete) 9/11/2013  11:14 AM 
322 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 20:287 2013 
application of universal human rights principles, particularly the Yogyakarta 
Principles.  But such a model of advocacy will not be effective in the Arab world.  
Several scholars, most notably Joseph Massad, have criticized this model as 
Western, imperialist, and based on a heterosexual/homosexual binary that is not 
relevant in the Arab world.  Apart from being an imperialist “incitement of 
discourse” that creates gays and lesbians where they do not exist, this conflation 
of sexual conduct and sexual identity has been viewed as problematic. 
Theoretical criticisms aside, from a practical standpoint these critiques raise 
serious questions about whether or not an open “Stonewall” model of gay rights 
advocacy could even function in the Arab world right now.  There is good reason 
to believe that it would not, particularly after engaging with the work of Hassan 
El Menyawi, who attempted this model of advocacy and found himself the target 
of the Egyptian government’s wrath.  Through his experiences, El Menyawi 
created a new model of advocacy, “activism from the closet,” whereby he and 
other closeted advocates could push for other non-explicitly LGBT rights, such as 
the right to privacy, which would ultimately benefit LGBT people or those that 
participate in same-sex sexual activity. 
Despite his prior experiences, El Menyawi has recently been reenergized by 
the Arab Spring, looking to the revolutions as an opportunity to envision new 
possibilities for LGBT rights advocacy in the Arab world.  While his hope and 
excitement are certainly understandable, the aftermath of the Arab spring is still 
uncertain, particularly for LGBT people.  The rise of Islamist groups in the 
region, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Ennahda, and recent statements 
from people like the human rights prime minister Samir Dilou in Tunisia, as well 
as the OIC and the Arab group during the recent UN Human Rights Council’s 
panel on sexual orientation and gender identity, seem to demonstrate that now is 
not the time to abandon El Menyawi’s “activism from the closet” model.  
Alongside Sonya Katyal’s integrated “additive/substitutive” model for sexual 
identity, advocates can try to expose Arab cultures to new models of sexual 
identity while attempting to strengthen privacy rights and pushing for the 
banning of torture in general (not just as it relates to LGBT people). 
At this point, it is hard to say if this model can or will develop over time, 
and if the idea of an open, sexual identity model will ever be feasible in the Arab 
world.  Whether it likes it or not, the Arab world is being exposed to Western 
ideas and situations more and more, and, as Whitaker argues, “the old ways look 
increasingly unsustainable as foreign travel, satellite television and the Internet 
crack open Arab society’s protective cocoon.”247  Moreover, we must remember 
that the idea of gay rights is fairly new to the Western world, is still not 
universally accepted, and that it took time to start this change in attitudes.  
Although Whitaker noted back in 2006 that many Arabs he interviewed were 
“deeply pessimistic about the likelihood of significant change,”248 he also noted 
that “[t]he denunciations of sexual non-conformity emanating from the Arab 
world today are also uncannily similar, in both their tone and their arguments, to 
those that were heard in other places years ago . . . and ultimately rejected.”249   
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For now, it is a good idea for advocates to wait and see how the aftermath of 
the Arab Spring will play out, and in the meantime engage in “activism from the 
closet” à la El Menyawi.  A rainbow flag may not fly high in the Arab world for 
the time being, but, using the “activism from the closet” model of advocacy, 
Arab LGBT people, and those engaging in same-sex acts, can at least strategize 
about the future of gay rights advocacy from a place of safety.  
